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watch videoThe financing of the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has increasingly attracted international attention in recent years, largely due to the high-profile actions of proliferation actors such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran.
At its core, proliferation financing (PF) focuses on the risks associated with financial products and services which are directly linked to the trade in proliferation-sensitive items.
There is a new requirement for all supervised firms to perform a proliferation financing (PF) risk assessment (similar to the AML firm-wide risk assessment) so that each firm can assess the risk it may be used to enable proliferation financing. This requirement came into effect 1 September 2022.
AIA’s view is that the risk of proliferation financing in its firms, or of its firms being used to enable proliferation, is predominantly low.
Proliferation financing means the act of providing funds or financial services for use, in whole or in part, in the manufacture, acquisition, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling of, or otherwise in connection with the possession or use of, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, including the provision of funds or financial services in connection with the means of delivery of such weapons and other CBRN-related goods and technology, in contravention of a relevant financial sanctions obligation. HM Treasury publishes a National Risk Assessment of proliferation financing.
The UK has a robust, bespoke regulatory framework in place to combat the threat posed by PF and adherence to this regulatory framework will assist firms in mitigating their PF risk. A key focus is the implementation of UK and UN sanctions regimes on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea/DPRK), Iran and chemical weapons activity. These sanctions measures apply to anyone in the UK’s jurisdiction, action taken by a UK national outside of the UK and to companies incorporated in the UK. Obligations under the measures imposed by the UN are set out in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and relevant counter-PF (CPF) measures set out in UK legislation, such as CPF sanctions regimes implemented under Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA). In addition to UNSCR 1540, a number of other UNSCRs can have some relevance, including UNSCR 1673(2006); and 1810(2008) on non-proliferation in general; and resolutions related to specific countries of proliferation concern, such as UNSCRs 1695(2006); 1718(2006); and 1874(2009) on North Korea; and UNSCRs 1737(2006); 1747(2007); and 1803(2008) on Iran.
Given the significant focus of the UNSCRs, UK legislation and FATF guidance on PF relate directly to Iran and DPRK, the provision of accountancy services to companies connected with either of these jurisdictions poses an extremely high risk. Businesses should only provide such services in rare circumstances after taking appropriate legal advice.
Actors involved in facilitating proliferation financing look to exploit the UK’s and ROI’s position in the global economy and international financial system to raise funds to develop chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) programmes that threaten international peace and security.
Firms must assess the risks of proliferation financing and introduce policies, procedures, systems, and controls where risk exposure is identified.
Proliferation financing relates to the financing of:
‘the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual-use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations’. FATF, Combating Proliferation Financing
Risk assessments have become a central feature of national responses to the dual threats posed by ML and TF. A sound understanding of PF risk is critical to policy development for the public as well as being vital for effective implementation of counter-PF measures for both public sector and private sector groups.
The NRA, published by HM Treasury using evidence from government and non-government partners, sets out the key proliferation financing risks and vulnerabilities in the UK.
This assessment – published by HM Treasury, using input from a wide range of government, private sector and academic partners – highlights the key proliferation financing threats facing the UK today, as well as the specific vulnerabilities in the UK economy and financial system which actors may target to gain financing for their proliferation activities.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1020695/National_risk_assessment_of_proliferation_financing.pdf
The FATF recently revised its Standards (R.1 and INR.1) to require countries, financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to identify, assess, understand and mitigate their proliferation financing risks.
The FATF Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment and Mitigation helps countries, financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs effectively implement these new FATF requirements, introduced in October 2020.
The Guidance explains how both public and private sectors should conduct risk assessments in the context of proliferation financing, and how they can mitigate the risks they identify. It provides an updated list of indicators of the potential breach, non-implementation or evasion of proliferation financing targeted financial sanctions.
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financingofproliferation/Proliferation-financing-risk-assessment-mitigation.html
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financingofproliferation/Statement-proliferation-financing-2020.html
A proliferation financing risk, similar to an ML/TF risk, can be seen as a function of three factors: threat, vulnerability, and consequence.
Accountants are required to identify, assess and understand their proliferation financing risks, including understanding breaches, non-implementations and evasions of controls.
Risk Analysis
Dual Use Items/Goods
Dual-use items are goods, software, technology, documents and diagrams which have civil and military uses. Ranging from raw materials such as aluminium alloys or bearings to components and complete systems. They could be material used in the research and development of weapon systems (i.e. machine tools, chemical manufacturing equipment and computer components).
Example Risk Factors
The following examples are non-exhaustive but may help you identify proliferation financing risk when considering your client’s business activities.
If you identify clients linked to risks outlined above, or identify aspects of clients’ supply chains linked to the above risk, then you should ensure you conduct enhanced due diligence on these clients, note your results, and adjust your business relationship accordingly in line with the guidance AIA provides.
You should also familiarise yourself with your reporting obligations as a supervised firm.
For its supervised population AIA monitor sanctions including Proliferation Financing compliance, as part of our risk-based inspections, desk-based reviews, and other monitoring of our regulated population.
We would expect to see firms considering Proliferation Financing as part of their own risk assessments.
AIA is not responsible for the content or accuracy of third party information and recommends members seek expert advice if required.